Abstract Index insurance is often promoted as a solution to many of the barriers that are thought to limit the supply of formal insurance coverage to smallholder farmers and livestock owners in developing countries. This manuscript summarizes the state of index insurance, paying special attention to the key challenges facing index insurance if it is to become a more effective tool for development. We then offer recommendations to tackle those challenges by strategically investing in a set of public goods and services geared towards addressing key informational gaps and improving the quality of index insurance products around the world.
have been observed using detrimental coping strategies that include selling off productive capital, skipping meals, and withdrawing children from school (Hoddinott 2006; . Thus, the threat of shocks (i.e., risk), the shocks themselves (i.e., adverse realized outcomes), and the strategies used to cope with them play a crucial role in the long-term wellbeing of these households (Rosenzweig and Binswanger 1993; Morduch 1995; Zimmerman and Carter 2003; Dercon 2004; Barnett, Barrett, and Skees 2008; Barrett and Carter 2013) .
Agricultural insurance holds a special appeal to researchers and policymakers seeking to reduce vulnerability and promote productivity growth among poor rural populations in regions where rain-fed agriculture is widespread and financial market failures are common (Dercon 2005; . When insurance transfers a portion of income risk out of the household's portfolio, farmers are then able to increase investments in higher-risk/higher-yield production technologies, such as improved seeds and inputs (Morduch 1995; Dercon and Christiaensen 2011) . When shocks inevitably hit, households that anticipate and receive indemnity payments have more response options, potentially reducing their reliance on detrimental coping strategies. In principle, insurance can also crowd-in credit, as households with asset or income insurance pose less risk to creditors (Alderman and Haque 2007; Barrett et al. 2007; Carter, Galarza, and Boucher 2007; Carter, Cheng, and Sarris 2016) . Similarly, some researchers have posited that bundling insurance with productivity-increasing investments could positively increase welfare outcomes (Smith and Watts 2009; Lybbert and Carter 2015) .
The relatively high overhead costs of collecting actuarial data, classifying risk, monitoring for moral hazard, and validating claims has obstructed the development of markets for conventional loss-indemnifying agricultural insurance in rural regions of developing countries. Index insurance is promoted as a low-cost alternative for conventional insurance products (Alderman and Haque 2007; Barnett, Barrett, and Skees 2008; Mahul and Stutley 2010) . If policies are based on indices developed from easily observable and exogenous phenomena such as weather, there may be no need to collect costly household-level actuarial data. In response, many index policies use indices generated from remotely-sensed data that are already being collected and are freely available. These data are often available in near real-time and their processing can be automated, thereby eliminating the need to collect data from client households to classify their risk or to validate their claims. The hope among policymakers and researchers testing these products is that index-based insurance is a commercially-viable approach in many settings where conventional insurance products are impractical.
Worldwide, the number of farmers insured by index insurance products today is at least in the tens of millions (Greatrex et al. 2015) . While the related empirical literature on the impacts of index insurance remains thin, it also underscores the promise that has motivated these initiatives. Households with index insurance reduce their dependence on detrimental coping strategies during severe shocks Jensen, Barrett, and Mude 2016a) , increase investments in production, and, in some cases, make riskier production choices, which are all consistent with the mechanisms described by economic theory (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2013; Karlan et al. 2014; Cai et al. 2015; Jensen, Barrett, and Mude 2016a) . There is also evidence that insurance increases average total farm revenue (net of insurance premiums and indemnity payments) among Ghanaian farmers (Karlan et al. 2014) , and produces gains in both livestock productivity and child health for pastoralists in Kenya (Jensen, Barrett, and Mude 2016a) . In addition, the peace of mind of having insurance coverage increases the subjective welfare of insured Ethiopian households, even in cases when there have been no indemnity payments (Tafere et al. 2015) .
The above findings are promising, but early (probably naïve) hopes that index insurance would quickly make high quality and affordable formal insurance coverage available to large numbers of smallholder farmers and herders in low-income countries has not come to pass. In many ways, the track record of index insurance has been disappointing. Index insurance products often face extremely low demand from the very farmers the products are designed to help (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012) . Additionally, most index insurance projects have not been rigorously evaluated due to a lack of empirical data. The very advantage of index insurance-that product development, actuarial calculations, and indemnity payments are all made according to an index-leaves developers and providers with little or no incentive to collect or analyze household-level data that might prove the impact and value of their own products. The continued dearth of thorough information on impacts from index products is rather remarkable, especially given the considerable resources that have been spent developing and marketing index insurance projects, and the longstanding calls for more and better empirical analysis (Smith and Watts 2009; Cole et al. 2012; Miranda and Farrin 2012) . Even if index insurance does improve the lives of purchasers, the philanthropic or public funds used to facilitate the development and extension/marketing (and often premium subsidies) of index insurance could perhaps be used more effectively elsewhere. Both proponents and critics of index insurance have pointed to these and other potential shortcomings of index insurance, claiming that much of the excitement around index insurance is poorly placed (Smith and Watts 2009; Binswanger-Mkhize 2012; Miranda and Farrin 2012; Smith 2016 ).
Yet while the debate around the merits of index insurance remains unsettled in the minds of researchers and practitioners alike, funding for index insurance as a social protection and development tool continues to expand across the globe. In that context, this paper argues that too little attention has been paid to evaluating and improving index insurance product quality and the underlying market structure. The first generation of agricultural index insurance development has focused overwhelmingly on product development, measuring product uptake, and (more recently and rarely) estimating the impacts of index insurance coverage on rural households. We propose that the next generation of research and action on agricultural index insurance in the developing world might productively foster the emergence of higher-quality index insurance products at scale. To that end, this paper focuses on identifying solutions to obstacles of market development at scale, especially in the form of public goods, or at least investments with low marginal costs so that entire index insurance networks could benefit. We identify three key investments-quality standards, impacts-based targeting, and expert support-that could each individually or collectively increase the potential value offered by index products in developing countries by Agricultural Index Insurance for Development generating public goods that work towards overcoming those barriers and improving product quality.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next two sections build on the existing literature by examining challenges to the supply of and demand for index insurance, and focusing on practical issues associated with the logistics of implementation and factors that have contributed to knowledge gaps.
1 The following section explores emergent opportunities where targeted investments might help overcome key cross-cutting obstacles to informed market growth of high-quality index insurance products that the available evidence suggests may generate significant gains for rural households in developing countries. The final section concludes.
Supply Challenges: Product Design, Implementation, and Quality
Although no reliable enumeration exists of the total number of agricultural index insurance products that have been implemented in the developing world, the number is likely to be in the hundreds, spanning dozens of countries (Barnett and Mahul 2007; Mahul and Stutley 2010) . 2 These products have been developed and marketed by national governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) research centers, private firms, universities, and multilateral organizations. Implementation commonly involves publicprivate partnerships where the products are initiated and designed by outside researchers, NGOs, or multilateral agencies in partnership with local insurers using philanthropic or public funds. The local insurance companies commonly serve as an important hub, interfacing with researchers during product design, as well as with national government regulators to get new products approved, with local retail agents to sell policies and distribute indemnity payments, and with reinsurers to price policies and move a large portion of the (necessarily covariate) risk into international capital markets.
Regulatory Environments
Similar to conventional insurance, index insurance needs a regulatory framework to provide standards for consumer protection. This framework should include standard insurance regulations, such as minimum capital-toliability holdings requirements for insurer and reinsurers, clear index certification processes, and a process for speedy and accessible disputed settlement resolutions. Beyond those minimum standards, however, index insurance is similar to microfinance products with characteristics that require special consideration. In some cases, the potential clients of index insurance are illiterate and/or have little understanding of formal financial tools so that complicated contracts may be a barrier to insurance coverage while adding very little consumer protection. Other regulatory considerations include allowing for unconventional insurance agents such as NGOs or microfinance institutions, and setting appropriate policies on documentation requirements and reserve holdings.
3
There may also be a regulatory risk for the insurer. In some cases, index insurance is not supported by the existing legal definitions of insurance because losses and indemnity payments are not necessarily tied. Under some regulations, index contracts are not enforceable or are even illegal. The Global Index Insurance Facility (GIIF) has made considerable investments in improving the regulatory environment for index insurance by helping countries to develop an appropriate regulatory framework for microinsurance and index insurance. For example, GIIF helped draft a revision of the code used by the regional body of the insurance industry for 14 countries in Francophone Africa (Inter-African Conference on Insurance Markets), so that it explicitly allows for index and microinsurance (GIIF n.d.).
Product Design
Most index insurance products focus on weather-related shocks because (i) exogenous rainfall and temperature levels and timing pose a primary risk for low-input cultivators and herders, (ii) the spatially covariate nature of weather shocks is especially well-suited for index products, which explicitly insure against covariate shocks, and (iii) satellite platforms and terrestrial meteorological station networks provide abundant, high-frequency historical and near-real-time weather data, typically at low or no cost to researchers and insurers. In many cases, weather shocks are extensive enough that remotely-sensed data, even of low resolution, are sufficient to monitor for shocks. In addition, spatial covariance allows for the use of spatial statistical models to impute data for regions without direct observation, further reducing the burden of data collection.
Developing a high-quality index insurance product requires a signal that can be used to develop indemnity schedules that are highly correlated with covariate losses. Unfortunately, actuarial calculations require long series of historical data, which generally excludes (i) indices that use the newer, more sophisticated, remotely sensed data, or (ii) the option of building indices from data generated by newly-installed weather stations or surveys. Thus, the quality of index products that can be marketed is presently limited by scarce data sources that have been in operation for a long time.
A particular challenge for index insurance is basis risk, the imperfect relationship between the indemnity payments made by an index policy and the actual insured losses experienced by the policyholder. Basis risk is a direct result of the reduced data and monitoring requirements for index insurance and leads to both unindemnified losses and unwarranted indemnity payments (Jensen, Barret and Mude 2016) . To minimize basis risk, the index must be highly correlated with the insured risk.
6 But to maintain cost savings, the index must be exogenous and available at low cost. Often, these two motives-high coverage and low cost-are at odds. For example, an index developed from historical yield samples of a farmer's field are likely to be highly correlated with that farm's yield, but are expensive to collect and are endogenous to the farmer's actions. 7 Conversely, area-average precipitation estimates constructed from remotely-sensed data are freely available and exogenous to any one farm's production strategies, but probably do not correlate as well with yields. Moreover, as Miranda (1991) points out, even an area-yield product that perfectly covers all covariate risk leaves households facing idiosyncratic risk. The result is that the value of an index product necessarily varies across heterogeneous populations. Add likely errors in the index estimates-that is, that they do not track area average losses precisely-and commercial loadings to cover the costs and profit margins of the insurer, and it is possible that an index insurance product could be more like a lottery ticket than an insurance policy, offering purchasers negative expected returns with negligible correlation between indemnity payments and actual losses suffered. An index insurance contract could even harm specific types of individuals by extracting premium payments while providing little or no actual risk coverage. By rigorously analyzing basis risk, insurance providers might minimize this kind of "lottery ticket" outcome.
Evaluating and minimizing basis risk requires a comparison of the losses experienced by clients and indemnity payments triggered by a prospective index. In most cases, indemnity payments-simulated or actual-are available to the insurer, but obtaining loss data requires an investment in data collection that insurers may have little or no incentive to pursue. Instead, premiums are commonly set using actuarial calculations of the index and the relationship between the index and losses is assumed. 8 In some cases, that index-actual loss relationship has turned out to be quite weak, generating what are sometimes called a "basis event" in which large covariate shocks cause severe losses while the product's index does not trigger payments. Occasionally, projects have been forced to make ex gratia indemnity payments after basis events rather than risk losing the confidence of their clients, funders, or the local government (e.g., FSD Kenya 2013; Kerer 2013; Food and Agricultural Organization 2014) . The result is an uncertain market environment for insurers, where there is risk of being obligated to make payments that were not accounted for when establishing the premium rates. Repeated ex gratia payments signal an unsustainable (and poorly designed) contract.
There have been some recent innovations in index insurance design that are worth noting. The ACRE product in Kenya provides a menu of coverage options, each developed to cover a specific agricultural phase, allowing clients greater flexibility in the risk that they choose to insure. The index-based livestock insurance (IBLI) product in Kenya used historical household-level data and econometric methods to statistically minimize expected basis risk use the term "correlation" as a generic indicator of basis risk, acknowledging that there may be more appropriate metrics. 7 Insured outcomes that are endogenous to the policyholder's attributes or behaviors give rise to problems of adverse selection and moral hazard, respectively, which also pose problems for the emergence and pricing of commercial insurance. Readers interested in these "asymmetric information" issues are directed to Hirshleifer and Riley (1992) for an in-depth treatment. 8 That is not to say that there is not strong evidence for the direction of the relationship between the signal and the outcome, but indemnity calibration requires local data that is not usually collected.
Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy (Chantarat et al. 2013) . The ACRE product has also recently developed an index that makes payments before predictable drought-related losses are incurred in order to provide indemnity payments that can be used to protect assets at risk, as opposed to replacing lost assets.
Implementation
Index insurance schemes need insurance firms with the desire and capacity to sell the product on the ground in rural communities. In most cases, existing domestic firms are recruited from metropolitan areas because they already have domestic capacity and regulatory approval. A primary challenge arises, however, because index products are as new to most domestic insurers and brokers as they are to their new potential clients. In addition, the urban insurers are typically unfamiliar with the rural customer base they are trying to reach with these new products. Before index insurance can be offered, sales agents need to be trained in the new product and mass education schemes need to be developed and implemented for potential clients, who may be illiterate and unfamiliar with insurance concepts. To complicate matters further, local clients may not trust insurance agents from outside their region or that are from a different ethnic group, so an entirely new sales force may need to be recruited and trained. Where index insurance is being used to extend formal insurance markets into new regions, new supply chains must be developed. Agencies may need to create methods for documenting sales, collecting premiums, providing customer support, and making indemnity payments in isolated rural regions. If the insurance is linked to other products (e.g., fertilizer, seed, or credit), additional legal arrangements also need to be developed.
These large sunk costs can discourage investment by local insurers. Add to that the relatively small size of policies demanded and general uncertainty around demand, and there are considerable incentives for insurers to "free ride", letting other firms lay the groundwork and develop the new market while they wait to see the outcomes.
9 Thus, many rural areas become trapped in a low-level equilibrium with no insurance products available.
One common approach for breaking out of that trap and sparking the emergence of index insurance products has been to use public or donor funds to pay for many of the sunk costs of product design and early consumer education campaigns. In some cases, index insurance product developers may offer the initial local insurer a limited-time monopoly on the donor-developed product, in conjunction with premium subsidies to purchasers, as a way to reduce risk to local insurers while stimulating uptake of the new products.
We are aware of no case where a donor-funded pilot project or government-funded index insurance program has led to the development of an unsubsidized private market for index insurance in a developing country. Critics of index insurance point to the failure of unsubsidized index insurance markets to develop as evidence that index insurance does not meet the critical needs of its intended clients. The emergence of private, unsubsidized markets may not be the appropriate measure of success, however, if agricultural index insurance is seen as an alternative to other publiclyfunded social protection measures for farmers (as is the case for agricultural insurance in high-income countries).
Reinsurance Markets
In many index insurance schemes, as with many other insurance products, local insurers prefer to have reinsurers take on the majority of the insured risk. The commercial premium rates for policies sold in the field then reflect the markups offered by reinsurers on top of those by the primary insurer. Because the pool of reinsurers for specialized agricultural insurance products in developing countries is limited, index insurance product designers and insurers often have very little bargaining power with their prospective reinsurers.
10 As a result, concerns about imperfect competition in reinsurance markets is widespread.
The proprietary nature of actuarial calculations further reduces the bargaining power and capacity for those seeking reinsurance because there is little accessible information on how rates are calculated. Anecdotally, the rates offered by reinsurers often include a large markup. One hypothesis is that in the absence of adequate high-quality data, uncertainty-averse reinsurers place a large premium penalty on uncertainty (Carter 2013) . Because the greatest uncertainty is associated with infrequent events such as catastrophes requiring large payouts, uncertainty aversion could drive the premium rates up considerably. Unfortunately, reinsurers are typically unwilling to provide such proprietary information on their actuarial calculations, which makes it more difficult for index insurance projects to learn from disagreements over rate-setting and adapt subsequent policy designs, such as adjusting policy parameters or integrating multiple datasets, so as to reduce the premiums imposed by reinsurers.
A specific form of uncertainty aversion and associated insurance markups arises from climate change. Index insurance products are typically priced using historical data series to estimate the frequency and magnitude of prospective indemnity payments. A significant number of observations are required, which typically means product designers draw on data from at least a decade or two earlier. Concerns that climate has shifted permanently leads some actuarial consultants to add an "ambiguity wedge" to estimated payouts. This sort of bias in the estimates used to price new products cannot be overcome with additional historical data, and downscaling of climate forecasts has thus far proven to be too coarse to enable out-of-sample validation against established climate change models (Mahowald et al. 2012) .
There is some recent, preliminary evidence of increased market competition among reinsurers of agricultural index insurance products, which may begin to drive prices down. For example, the newly-created African Risk Capacity, a specialized agency of the African Union, provides an alternative risk pooling and transfer mechanisms that may also directly or indirectly improve the reinsurance market for index insurance. In addition, as the time series used to construct indices grows longer, reinsurers will be able to estimate the risks that they are insuring more precisely, and the uncertainty premium may fall.
Product Quality and the Information Gap
The nature of most index insurance-proprietary actuarial calculations and infrequent payouts triggered by irregular events-makes it very difficult to discern the quality of index products even when data are available (Clarke and Wren-Lewis 2013) . This information problem holds for all parties; neither the client nor donor agencies nor insurance providers can easily determine product quality without long series of data. This creates adverse incentives in product design because it becomes difficult to establish ex ante whether costly investments in more sophisticated designs or additional data collection really improves product design, thereby creating strong incentives to underinvest in product design.
The absence of empirical evidence on product quality has called into question the fidelity of index products to their "insurance" label (Jensen, Barrett, and Mude forthcoming). In extreme cases, even subsidized insurance could harm households by reallocating income from poor periods to good periods. Below we discuss our proposal to develop quality standards and metrics to improve product quality and identify products that are unlikely to benefit their clients.
Demand Challenges: Poverty, Product Relevance, and Low Demand Although there has been tremendous growth in the supply of index insurance in developing countries, voluntary uptake (demand) is commonly low, as are coverage rates among those that purchase index insurance. Slow diffusion of innovations is commonplace (Rogers 1962) . Nevertheless, there are well-founded concerns that perhaps fundamental issues associated with the products have limited demand for index insurance far more than many proponents imagined.
Poverty and Product Relevance
At the most basic level, index insurance products must offer coverage for covariate risks that pose a relatively large threat to prospective clients' economic well-being and for which they do not already have effective responses. In spite of the general absence of formal financial products in developing countries, agricultural households do use a constellation of risk management strategies such as migration, diversification, or informal risk pooling. It remains an open question whether index insurance fills a real gap for smallholder farmers.
Because index insurance is championed as a tool for fighting poverty, it is important to design programs and products that address the unique challenges of these vulnerable populations. One concern that has been raised is that poor farmers may be the least likely to have the liquidity required to purchase policies (Binswanger-Mkhize 2012) or to have experience with complex financial instruments. Indeed, poor farmers are Agricultural Index Insurance for Development typically the least likely to adopt a new (risky) technology (Dercon and Christiaensen 2011) . In environments where poverty traps are likely, simulations find that households just above the poverty line-those that insurance could feasibly help the most-are also the least likely to purchase insurance (Janzen, Carter, and Ikegami 2013) . Wealth and liquidity constraints have been shown to be important to demand rates across a variety of products and populations, which suggests limitations in the use of commercial index insurance as a tool for helping the poorest subpopulations (Giné, Townsend, and Vickery 2008; Cole et al. 2013; Jensen, Mude, and Barrett 2016) .
Finally, index insurance products are commonly limited to a single risk associated with one type of production (e.g., drought risk for crops). Critics have pointed out that the effects of extreme weather events often extend far beyond losses associated with a single crop-affecting labor markets, local prices for other goods, and yields for other crops-so that even the most accurate single-crop index product leaves households facing considerable shock-related risk (Collier, Barnett, and Skees 2010; Nikolova et al. 2011 ).
Low Demand
The empirical literature on demand for index insurance has mostly focused on household and contract characteristics that vary within a given project. This approach is useful for determining how small changes can affect demand for insurance on the margin. But overall demand has been very low for many index insurance products. A scan of the literature shows the larger issues that have been revealed across products and populations.
A major challenge to demand is client education and trust. Index insurance pilots often enter regions where potential clients have very little experience with insurance, no experience at all with an index product, and commonly no prior experience with the underwriting firm nor its agent(s). Developing these new markets requires educating consumers on the concepts of insurance and the nuances of the index insurance product. Consumers must also trust the insurer and its agents and have legal recourse available to them because premiums are generally paid at the onset of insurance contracts' completion, leaving clients with all of the risk associated with contractual nonperformance. Experimental studies have found that improved understanding of the product and trust in the insurance agents are important factors affecting demand (Cai, de Janvry, and Sadoulet 2011; Jensen, Mude, and Barrett 2016; Pratt, Suarez, and Hess 2010) .
Consistent with both the educational and trust mechanisms, observed demand often covers only a small share of the assets or income at risk, which is more consistent with a model of consumer experimentation than with one of planned risk reduction. Consumers' desire to learn first about product quality and/or agents'/insurers' trustworthiness is supported by findings that households are more likely to purchase if they have observed someone in their village receiving an indemnity payment (Cole, Stein, and Tobacman 2014) . Considering the large Hawthorne effect that has been observed with index insurance, it may be that the knowledge gap and trust issues are much more severe than is widely appreciated.
11 The implication is that index insurance projects should also make complementary investments in extension and marketing, and that there is a prospective role for regulation to ensure product quality. Basis risk is believed to dampen demand for index products for the intuitive reason that the higher a product's basis risk, the less true insurance coverage it offers a prospective buyer (Miranda and Farrin 2012; BinswangerMkhize 2012; Clarke 2016) . Indeed, the few recent studies that are able to incorporate estimates of basis risk find that basis risk for index products can be considerable (e.g., Clarke et al. 2012; Jensen, Barrett, and Mude forthcoming) and that basis risk (or proxies for it) reduces demand for index products (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Hill, Robles, and Ceballos 2013; Karlan et al. 2014; Jensen, Mude, and Barrett 2016) .
Demand for index insurance is also price sensitive, but usually price inelastic. Published estimates range from -0.35 to -1.16, and often demand remains very low even when premiums are heavily subsidized (Mobarak and Rosenzweig 2012; Cole et al. 2013; Hill, Robles, and Ceballos 2013; Jensen, Mude, and Barrett 2016; Bageant and Barrett forthcoming) . The result is that subsidies alone are unlikely to be an effective tool for generating a largely insured population unless those subsidies are extremely high. The evidence to date is limited as to whether demand will be sustained if subsidies are dropped quickly.
12
Barriers to demand can be cultural. For example, the original IBLI product offered in northern Kenya was not compliant with Sharia law (Islamic religious law) and thus was inaccessible for the millions of Muslim pastoralists of the region. To extend formal insurance markets to Muslim pastoralists, Takaful Insurance of Africa, Ltd., launched Index-Based Livestock Takaful, a Sharia-compliant index product that provides coverage against drought (MacMillan 2014). Taboos against betting on bad outcomes is another cultural barrier that index insurance projects have had to overcome.
Field experiments have identified key behavioral characteristics that may also be partially responsible for the low demand experienced by many index products (Elabed and Carter 2015; Serfilippi, Carter and Guirkinger 2015) . Behind most economists' support for index insurance is a model of standard expected utility theory that shows that clients will benefit from and thus demand index insurance. This model shapes how insurance products are developed, how extension and marketing are performed, and how contracts are structured. However, a set of experiments by Serfilippi, Carter, and Guirkinger (2015) reveals that preferences for certainty (as opposed to uncertainty) among farmers in western Burkina Faso are much higher than is predicted by expected utility theory. This represents a key issue for demand of index insurance sold using the standard framing, with (certain) premium payments and infrequent (uncertain) indemnity payments, and can only be greater than that of extension efforts. Either through the building of trust, unintended product education, or because of a feeling of obligation, surveyed households often have much greater demand for the product under study than does the general population as a whole. For example, about 40% of the IBLI survey sample in northern Kenya has purchased IBLI while less than 1% of the general population of that region has purchased (Jensen, Mude, and Barrett 2016) . Similar outcomes have been reported in India (Cole et al. 2013 ) and in Ethiopia (Sarris 2014) . 12 Takahashi et al. (2016) is the only study that the authors are aware of that examines the impact of a reduction to subsidy levels on demand. The author finds that reducing subsidies does reduce demand, but does not find evidence of a penalty to demand due to an price anchoring effect, which would be a concern if subsidies were intended to be used temporarily in order to speed up the experimentation process.
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A different set of experiments by Elabed and Carter (2015) finds that farmers perceive index-insured risk as a compound lottery with uncertainty around the insured risk and uncertainty around how well the index will reflect their losses (basis risk). These authors find that 60% of their sample from southern Mali are compound risk averse. Analysis of willingness-to-pay indicates that under moderate basis risk, the levels of compound risk aversion observed in their sample could cut demand for index insurance in half.
Insurers can do very little to change the relative preferences for certainty or levels of compound risk aversion, but they can adjust their policies and the way that they are sold. Serfilippi, Carter, and Guirkinger (2015) find that simply reframing the contract terms can circumvent the uncertainty penalty placed on indemnity payments and increase willingness-to-pay among those that are uncertainty averse. The work by Elabed and Carter (2015) highlights the need for improved products since the already detrimental impact of basis risk on demand is amplified by compound risk aversion.
Opportunities to Improve Access to High-Quality, Formal Insurance Coverage
As noted in the previous sections, information gaps plague index insurance markets and are a hindrance to assessing and improving them. Unfortunately, many actors in index insurance markets have few incentives to invest in closing these gaps, and those that do may not have the expertise or clout. In the following section, we suggest a series of investments that can help to improve information along the entire marketing chain, increasing the likelihood that index insurance can become a useful tool for development.
Develop Quality Standards and Metrics
Arguably, the key need and opportunity to improve index insurance products is to develop a standard set of metrics and protocols for measuring and disseminating information on product quality. Markets for index products suffer from a serious information gap, where consumers, donors, local insurers, and reinsurers have no way to recognize or assess the value of index insurance products, to sort low-quality products (effectively, these are expensive lottery tickets) from high-quality ones that can deliver significant risk reduction. Clarke and Wren-Lewis (2013) note that index insurance is a type of "credence good" for which markets do not reliably converge on the optimal equilibrium. Instead, producers compete through the observable characteristic of their products-price-and have no profit incentive to invest in product quality because it remains mostly unobserved, often even over the duration of multiple contract periods. The result can be a market equilibrium in which the cheapest (and potentially lowest quality) products crowd out more expensive, higher-quality ones in a pooling equilibrium, and household demand is depressed by the combination of uncertainty and the occasional signal of poor product quality.
This information-related market failure can potentially be overcome if credible signals of product quality can be developed to resolve the crucial Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy information gap. Assuming latent untapped demand for high-quality insurance exists, as the mass of experimental studies now confirms, if consumers could distinguish between two equally-priced products of differing quality, market forces could then be relied on to reward investments in quality. The same goes for funders and insurers, who, all else being equal, would prefer to support high-quality products but also face the same informational deficiencies.
The problem is that quality measures and assessments must be standardized and objective in order to be comparable and trustworthy. Hence, the value of a set of public standards and metrics for index insurance products that includes information on the value proposition of each index product to consumers and the liability and uncertainty in liability to insurers and reinsurers. Such assessments, provided by an objective third-party assessor (much like bond rating agencies), could create a common framework with which to value index products. This approach can help address both (i) the information asymmetry created by proprietary pricing by reinsurers exercising some market power and (ii) the credence good characteristic of most agricultural index insurance products. Such standards and processes would be a public good, offering benefits along the entire market chain.
Product quality metrics afford some measure of consumer protection and can help stimulate competition by fostering comparisons among policies. This creates the right incentives for insurers and reinsurers to develop lowcost approaches to improve quality and avert the risk of a market flooded with low-value products (Clarke and Wren-Lewis 2014) . Competition could lead to innovative hybrid indices or new product designs such as the multiple strike policies piloted in Mali Elabed et al. 2016) or the statistically-derived livestock mortality rate Normalized Difference Vegetation Index (NDVI) response function piloted in northern Kenya (Chantarat et al. 2013) . Competition for new types of clients could lead to developing policies and marketing aimed at meso-level and/or wholesale clients (e.g., local governments, NGOs, farmer cooperatives, or lending institutions) that are also sensitive to covariate shocks but for which basis risk is less of an issue due to internal aggregation across members, clients, constituents, or borrowers. In addition, a standardized product quality metric should help to reduce the number of poor-quality products funded or marketed, thereby improving the average quality and reputation of marketed index insurance products, and encouraging more effective investments of scarce donor resources in this sector.
Standardized quality assessment methods can also facilitate the development of meaningful, linkable databases, which would act as a valuable resource for the development of new index insurance products, and would support the reasonable expectation that all index insurance products be subjected to careful scrutiny. Currently, there exist only a few formal analyses of the quality of indices (Funk and Budde 2009; Turvey and Mclaurin 2012; Jensen, Barrett, and Mude forthcoming) , and those studies use different evaluation techniques. Therefore, it is currently difficult to know whether differences in findings arise due to variation in policy parameters, contexts, or evaluation techniques. A database logging products with a standard set of metrics would help to foster an understanding of which types of policies and indices are typically most appropriate for certain environments and would help to identify critical data gaps that need to be filled for developing Agricultural Index Insurance for Development high-quality, second-generation products. Miranda and Farrin (2012) argue for the development of just such a database.
Metrics that also take into account reinsurers' needs could improve the supply of reinsurance for these products, and thereby help stimulate greater competition. At present, reinsurers must undertake costly, thorough product assessments themselves using proprietary methods and staff, which both limits the number of prospective reinsurers and drives up loadings and thus the final premium faced by policyholders. A uniform quality assessment protocol-or even service-could help reduce reinsurers' costs and stimulate a more competitive market, much as the rating agencies did in bond markets worldwide.
A public quality assessment service would also help prospective insurers and product developers identify precisely what types and quality of data are needed before designing and marketing a new product. This would also offer a guide to index insurance developers and local reinsurers, providing them with a clear and transparent path to reducing premium rates. Developers could knowledgeably examine the costs and benefits of data sources (public vs. proprietary, remotely-sensed vs. terrestrial, etc.) to determine if further investments are likely to improve product quality and premiums.
If donor agencies pre-commit only to fund products that satisfy a minimum quality standard, and to focus temporary product subsidies on the highest-quality products, they would increase the likelihood of product sustainability after the withdrawal of donor support. The transition from subsidized to commercially-viable index insurance product requires scaling to cover the significant fixed costs involved in new product development, as well as a product of sufficiently high quality and relevance that will sustain that level of demand. Sustained subsidies for the development and marketing of products of inferior quality dampens the return on investment for donors (and commercial investors). Greater initial attention to product quality following transparent and replicable protocols could go a long way toward addressing too-common deficiencies in product design and imperfect competition caused by credence good and asymmetric information problems in agricultural index insurance markets currently.
There have already been investments in developing and vetting metrics by members and partners of the Global Action Network (GAN) on Agricultural Insurance.
13 Importantly, the process used by GAN has included stakeholders across the supply chain of index insurance, including representatives from reinsurance firms, local insurance firms, and their implementing partners, academics, and funders. The GIIF is another multi-donor organization that is working with stakeholders across multiple projects; it offers expertise and funding to support the development of index insurance markets across a number of countries in South America, Africa, Asia, and Australia.
Although there is yet to be an agreed-upon set of standards or protocols for assessing them, such partnerships provide evidence that index insurance stakeholders and funders recognize the gains from coordinating to address the informational deficiencies that plague index insurance. Further investments to develop and build consensus around key product quality indicators and protocols for third-party assessors are critical to leverage the ongoing efforts and ensure continued progress.
Impacts-Based Targeting
Ensuring that a product has the potential to meet the goals of its donors and implementers, as well as the needs of potential clients, requires a careful ex ante assessment of potential project sites. Currently, such assessments are done case-by-case, if they are done at all.
14 Given the volume of investment in developing agricultural index insurance products for developing countries, there may be significant value in a large scale ex ante impact assessment and feasibility study, ideally drawing on the quality metrics discussed earlier, to help to direct public and private funds and technical work towards products that are most likely to meet broader objectives of social impact and financial sustainability. Such assessments can also reinforce an emphasis on product quality by ensuring that new projects invest in appropriate data and technical capacity from the beginning, so that continued monitoring and improvement is more affordable and likely.
Locations identified by needs assessment will likely include places where signal or loss data are not available or where a complete dearth of supporting infrastructure may render index insurance products infeasible or expensive. Developing high-quality products in data-scarce environments will likely be more expensive. However, the returns for a high-quality product could be much greater than those of a product that costs little to develop, but sees little uptake even as continued funding is used to subsidize the product. Moreover, the relevant point of comparison for philanthropic and public or donor agency investments in such products is the cost of providing alternative means of social protection, or of not providing any such protection at all. In places where emergency response is frequent and expensive, even relatively high-cost/high-quality index insurance products may prove to be a very cost-effective means of improving risk management and reducing the human and economic costs of catastrophic shocks.
Multiple data sources offer global coverage and the historical time series necessary for product development. Access to local historical data on losses or local signals is usually the limiting factor for index construction. Fortunately, innovative and effective approaches to collecting high-quality retrospective data are emerging that can correctly identify seasons with exceptionally poor outcomes for most households. For example, the sorts of events that result in large covariate losses are uncommon by definition, and often well-remembered by longtime local residents. The spatial correlation of such events can also be leveraged to improve the accuracy of catastrophe identification since neighboring communities should report similar shock timelines (Woodard, Shee, and Mude forthcoming) . Such data can be crossvalidated using public records such as regional aggregate data or humanitarian reports. With access to historical data on large covariate shocks, the development of high-quality indices from remotely-sensed data should be possible in many locations, at least for rain-fed agricultural systems. But all of this requires some reorientation towards investment driven by needs assessments, focused on developing index insurance products where the likely impacts are greatest, rather than only where data and an insurer willing to experiment happen to already be available.
Roles for Experts and Advisors
Several prospective roles exist for technical experts keen to help develop a portfolio of high-quality agricultural index insurance products targeted towards helping populations with the least access to effective covariate risk management. With coordination, most of these services would be relatively low cost to investors or could be covered by a donor agency.
Product Accelerator. There are opportunities in facilitating a more favorable reinsurance market for local index insurance insurers by offering services directly to the domestic-level insurers that are presently only available through global reinsurers. One approach is to provide small pilot projects with access to industry experts, perhaps as a sort of "index product accelerator" program. Many local insurers need expert guidance on the technical (actuarial) details of product development, and on how to better market their products to reinsurers. A pool of pro bono or subsidized expert providers could help accelerate the development of high-quality products and potentially help reduce information asymmetries between local insurers and global reinsurers.
Broker Services. Many insurers in developing countries lack access to affordable brokerage services to coordinate and negotiate reinsurance. Access is often limited to one or two reinsurers already familiar to the insurer. In some cases, brokers could not only facilitate access to a wider range of prospective reinsurers, thereby helping to stimulate more competitive pricing, they could also help assemble consortia to take on different risk layers or to bundle different products to better suit the needs of particular reinsurers or public facilities and achieve the scale sometimes necessary to access a broader array of prospective reinsurers.
A knowledgeable broker could prospectively help insurance sellers greatly reduce premium rates by identifying product or market characteristics that unnecessarily drive up premiums. For example, it is often claimed that reinsurers inflate rates because of insufficient data that leaves a great deal of uncertainty around infrequent but high-risk events. The claim seems reasonable but is unsubstantiated because reinsurer pricing is not transparent. A public brokerage service that interacts with insurers and reinsurers regularly could help shed some light on the issue and identify means by which insurers can get lower-cost reinsurance and offer lower premium products to prospective policyholders.
Public Catastrophic Reinsurance Facility. A public facility could be formed to take on the risk associated with infrequent but high-risk events that drive up premium rates due to reinsurers' ambiguity loadings. Such a public reinsurance facility could generate gains to insurers and policyholders by attenuating the uncertainty penalty that reinsurers commonly add to policies. If the public reinsurance facility had access to relevant information on estimated risks, for example, through the needs assessments discussed earlier, this is likely a no-or low-cost added function. In theory, as agricultural index insurance products mature beyond their pilot phase, more information becomes available on the risks that they cover and on product quality. This facility would operate as a support mechanism for pilot projects that, once Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy they had collected sufficient data to confirm the product's quality and to reduce their uncertainty penalty, would eventually transition fully into the commercial reinsurance market.
We should note that there are already facilities-such as the Global Index Insurance Facility (World Bank), the Agricultural Insurance Development Program (Netherlands/World Bank Group/USAID), Weather Risk Management Facility (World Food Program/International Fund for Agricultural Development), and the Impact Insurance Facility (International Labor Organization)-that explicitly work to facilitate the growth of index insurance markets in developing countries. In many cases, these organizations actively fill some of the above roles for a few select projects that they are partnering with. We believe that there is an opportunity to further the field through a public offering of these services or a more coordinated effort by the existing institutions to provide services more broadly.
Conclusions
Index insurance is not a panacea, and there are some situations in which even a high-quality index insurance product will not effectively assist agricultural households. In fact, the short lifespan and disappointing outcomes of some index insurance projects should serve as a caution against uncritical, wholesale promotion of index insurance products. However, the emerging empirical evidence shows that given appropriate circumstances and good data, index insurance can be a cost-effective method for offering social protection and improving the lives of rural agricultural households in developing countries.
Our survey of criticisms, evidence, and market barriers reveals opportunities where targeted investments could provide public goods that can considerably improve the likelihood that the current wave of index insurance pilot projects will lead to improved access to high-quality formal insurance, and help households in developing rural communities better manage risk and improve living standards. The recommendations provided here address weaknesses in index insurance development and markets, promoting the development of systems to improve the information on, quality of, and affordability of index insurance. These recommendations also provide the groundwork for addressing many of the criticisms that have been raised about index insurance and improved access to information, which could be used to empirically test those criticisms.
Considerable potential synergies exist among the prospective investments discussed above. Simply developing an appropriate set of metrics for product quality could improve consumer protection and reduce premiums, while at the same time elevating the equilibrium quality of the index insurance market as poor products are left unfunded. If the quality metrics include an indicator of ex ante assessed need, they could also be used in preliminary studies to ensure that product development prioritizes places where the need for and likely impacts of index insurance are the greatest, rather than just where time series data are readily available. The organization facilitating such an undertaking would need to pilot the quality metrics, which could lead it to directing needs-based funding and perhaps even to offering cover for the catastrophic risk layers of products that, according to its own metrics, are being overly penalized by uncertainty aversion in the reinsurance market. In other cases, the organization's positive assessment of a Agricultural Index Insurance for Development product's quality could directly improve the product's pricing, as assessment implies a form of certification and even regulatory monitoring, albeit in an extra-legal manner.
Any of the above investments could have far-reaching impacts for the agricultural index insurance market in developing countries. In many cases, the investments would increase product quality and reduce the cost of insurance simply by improving access to information. Addressing such informational issues can benefit clients and actors throughout the entire index insurance supply chain. Nevertheless, until those informational gaps have been addressed and markets have responded, there is no way to know the full extent to which agricultural index insurance will eventually benefit the well-being of rural households in developing countries.
